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Instrumental Authority and Its Challenges: The Case of the Laws of War* 
Jonathan Parry (Birmingham) and Daniel Viehoff (NYU) 
 
Note: This is prepublication draft of a paper that is forthcoming in Ethics as part of a symposium on 
Adil Haque’s Law and Morality at War (OUP, 2017). Please cite published version. 
 
Abstract: Law and Morality at War offers a broadly instrumentalist defence of the authority of the laws 
of war: these laws serve combatants by helping them come closer to doing what they have independent 
moral reason to do. We argue that this form of justification (invoked by many legal and political 
theorists) sets too low a bar. An authority’s directives are not binding, on instrumental grounds, if the 
subject could, within certain limits, adopt an alternative, and superior, means of conforming to 
morality’s demands. It emerges that Haque’s argument fails to vindicate the law’s authority over all (or 




At the heart of much contemporary writing on the ethics of war is a puzzle about the relation between 
the laws of war (or ‘law of armed conflict’, LOAC for short) and the moral rights and duties of 
combatants and non-combatants. The law famously treats those fighting just and unjust wars 
symmetrically: both sides are under the same legal duty not to target non-combatants, and neither is 
under a general legal duty not to target enemy combatants. By contrast, familiar moral principles 
governing killing and harming appear to attribute very different rights and duties to aggressors and 
defenders, and do not support a strict prohibition on targeting non-combatants. 
For example, a police officer who uses lethal force to prevent an armed robbery does not 
thereby become liable to be defensively killed by the robbers, despite threatening their lives. By parity 
of reasoning, many just war theorists suggest, it is hard to see how combatants who fight in justified 
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wars could become liable to defensive force simply by resisting unjust aggressors.1 So they retain their 
moral right not to be killed, and unjust combatants commit a grave moral wrong by killing them. Yet 
no corresponding duty on the unjust soldier is embodied in the laws of war.  
Common-sense morality also accepts that non-threatening individuals can be morally liable to 
defensive killing. For example, if five friends hire a hitman to kill an innocent person, then it seems 
plausible that each may permissibly be killed if necessary to prevent the hit, even though none poses 
a direct threat to the victim. (If the only way the victim can avoid the hitman’s bullets is by lethally 
using one of the five as a shield, then she would be morally permitted to do so.) By analogy, many 
contemporary just war theorists argue that some non-combatants render themselves liable in war, in 
virtue of their moral responsibility for unjust threats posed by combatants.2 And yet the laws of war 
prohibit targeting non-combatants altogether. 
Two responses to this apparent gap between the morality and law of war are common in the 
literature. One denies the ‘reductivist’ assumption that moral principles governing killing in non-
martial contexts are applicable to war, and instead holds that war gives rise to special moral rights and 
duties. On this view, the supposed gap is illusory, because the laws of war correctly reflect war’s sui 
generis morality.3 A different response accepts the reductivist assumption, and on that basis concludes 
that the laws of war misrepresent combatants’ moral duties. Yet rather than argue for revisions to the 
LOAC that would more faithfully reflect those duties, many reductivists hold that the law is morally 
justified, despite its deviation from morality, because it minimizes the overall harmfulness of war as 
much as is practically feasible.4 For instance, while morality imposes a blanket prohibition on killing 
in unjust wars, a law to this effect would simply be ignored, and give belligerents no incentive to spare 
civilians, nor to surrender. By instead adopting laws that pair a general permission to target combatants 
																																																						
1 See, most prominently, Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
2 See, e.g., Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Debate centres on what proportion of 
non-combatants are covered by the ‘some’. 
3 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 
4 See, e.g. Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status 
of Soldiers, eds. David Rodin and Henry Shue, 19-43 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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with an exceptionless prohibition on targeting civilians, the law of war provides incentives that 
minimize death and suffering overall.5  
In this essay we consider a third, and less commonly considered, response to the puzzle: The 
laws of war do indeed diverge from what morality requires. But this does not mean that they 
misrepresent what morality requires. For contrary to what most discussions of the puzzle assume, the 
laws of war do not claim to represent what morality requires in the first place. Rather, like all law, the 
LOAC claims to have authority over those to whom it applies, and thus to change what moral reasons 
they have. And if the LOAC in fact has the authority it claims to possess, then even though its norms 
diverge from the moral demands that ordinarily apply to agents engaged in harmful conduct, once the 
LOAC is in place, combatants have moral reason to follow these legally established norms.  
A sophisticated version of this ‘authority response’ is central to Adil Haque’s Law and Morality 
at War, and much of our discussion will focus on Haque’s argument.6 Haque, in line with much of the 
existing literature on legal authority, offers a broadly instrumentalist argument for the law’s authority: 
the LOAC serves combatants by issuing directives that help those who (try to) follow them to do what 
they have independent moral reason to do; and it is this service that establishes the law’s practical 
authority over combatants. Crucially, even though Haque accepts that just and unjust soldiers are in 
very different moral positions, he believes that the laws of war nonetheless serve, and thus have 
authority for, both sides.  
We argue that Haque’s proposal ultimately falls short. But its failure is instructive. It teaches 
us something important about the fundamental structure of instrumental justifications of authority, 
and about the relation between political and legal authority and the ethics of harm which, though 
central to much of our political life, has received relatively little philosophical attention.7 And once we 
																																																						
5 See, e.g., Janina Dill and Henry Shue, “Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St Petersburg Assumption,” 
Ethics and International Affairs 26 (2013): 311-334.   
6 Adil Ahmed Haque, Law and Morality at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Hereafter LMW. Unattributed 
page numbers in the text refer to this book. 
7 For some exceptions, see David Estlund, “On Following Orders in an Unjust War,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 
213-234; Massimo Renzo, “Political Authority and Unjust Wars,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming in 
print, published online 2018): https://DOI:10.1111/phpr.12487; Jonathan Parry, “Authority and Harm,” in Oxford Studies 
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grasp which specific features of Haque’s account are problematic, we can also better understand what 
conceptual space there may still be for an authority-based solution to the puzzle of law and morality 
in war (though within the confines of this paper, we cannot do more than gesture at the structure of 
such a solution).  
The essay proceeds as follows. After explaining Haque’s motivation for pursuing the authority 
response to the puzzle, we present his instrumental or ‘service’ argument for the authority of the laws 
of war (Section 2). Next we clarify the precise structure of Haque’s argument by distinguishing 
between instrumental justifications in general and what we call ‘remedial’ (instrumental) justifications, 
and showing that his argument (which depends on assumptions about morally problematic instances 
of ignorance or bias among combatants) falls into the latter category. ‘Remedial’ authority has only 
limited effect on the normative situation of its subjects. In particular, while (as Haque says) these 
subjects may have a permission “in the instrumental sense” (45) to obey authoritative directives even 
if this results in violating others’ rights, this permission does nothing to shield the subjects from blame 
for the violation, or from liability to pay compensation or suffer defensive harm. The permission 
instead merely bears on how the subjects ought to be guided in their deliberation by the authority’s 
directives (Section 3). In Section 4 we turn to the conditions under which the subjects indeed ought 
to be so guided. We argue that these are more demanding than is usually assumed. Even if obeying an 
authority improves a subject’s moral performance compared to how she would otherwise act, the authority’s 
directives are not morally binding if the subject could, within the limits set by her deficiencies that 
need correcting, adopt an alternative, and superior, means of improving her performance. In Section 
5, we apply our more stringent justificatory test to the laws of war, and argue that Haque’s argument 
fails to vindicate the LOAC’s authority over all (or even most) combatants. In addition, the basic 
structure of Haque’s argument – with its focus on broadly epistemic considerations – makes it difficult 
to defend the symmetrical authority of the laws of war for just and unjust combatants alike. And yet 
this symmetry is a central feature of the laws of war, and their claim to authority. In Sections 6, we 
return to the relation between the law’s authority and its justification. We argue that, though Haque’s 
argument fails to establish the LOAC’s authority for unjust combatants, it may nonetheless be morally 
good for such combatants to treat the LOAC as if it had authority. More generally, the more 
																																																						
in Political Philosophy 3, eds. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, 252-277 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017); Daniel Viehoff, “Legitimacy as a Right to Err,” Nomos LX (forthcoming).  
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demanding instrumental justification of authority we defend opens up conceptual space for rethinking 
the relation between an institution’s claim to authority and its overall justification.  
 
2. Haque on the Authority of the LOAC 
 
Haque pursues the authority response because he deems implausible both of the alternative, and more 
prominent, responses to the puzzle with which we started this essay. Specifically, though he accepts 
the reductivist account of the fundamental moral rights and duties of combatants, he also holds that 
simply pointing out that the laws of war may minimize harm (as many reductivists do) is 
philosophically inadequate.8 As Haque emphasizes, the laws of war are, indeed, laws; and like all laws, 
they claim authority over those to whom they apply.9 And even if the harm-minimisation view could 
successfully justify the LOAC’s existence, it would nonetheless fail to vindicate its claim to authority over 
combatants.  
Haque here invokes a distinction familiar from debates within political and legal philosophy 
between an institution’s justification and its authority.10 An institution is justified if its existence and activity 
is all-things-considered valuable. In virtue of its value, individuals may have moral reasons (or even 
duties) to create the institution, support it, refrain from undermining it, etc. An institution has authority 
over an agent S if it has the moral power to impose duties or binding reasons on S to j simply by 
directing S to j. Two points about authority are worth highlighting. First, authoritative directives are 
meant to have a privileged status in the subject’s practical reasoning: they are meant to largely settle 
what action the subject is to undertake, even in the face of countervailing reasons. We will call such 
reasons ‘binding’. Second, at least within certain limits, an authority’s directives are intended to be 
binding even if the subject takes them to be mistaken, and even if the directives are in fact mistaken.  
																																																						
8 Haque also objects that the harm-minimisation view, in virtue of its focus on aggregative outcomes, falls foul of familiar 
objections to consequentialism (LMW, 38-43). We largely leave this point aside here. 
9 Haque here follows a familiar line of argument in legal philosophy. See, e.g., John Gardner, “How Law Claims, What 
Law Claims,” in his Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General, 124-148 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
10 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics 109 (1999): 739-771, for a version of this distinction 
(though Simmons’ differs in some respects from the one we draw here).  
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Crucially for Haque’s purposes, an institution may be justified without having authority: it may 
be good that it exists, and so S has reason to support it, and yet its directives do not impose duties on 
S to do as directed. This may be because the value of the institution’s existence is in fact independent 
of its capacity to impose duties. (In the case of a legal system, for example, the benefit may rest solely 
on the additional incentives provided by the threat of punishment for breaking the law.) Alternatively, 
the value of the institution’s existence, though not unrelated to its capacity to impose duties, may not 
suffice to establish that S in particular has a duty to obey. (Perhaps the law’s directives contribute to the 
relevant good insofar as they guide others, but do not depend on S’s obedience.)  
So, Haque points out, even if the harm-minimization view is correct, and the laws of war 
produce overall good consequences by reducing net suffering, this does not establish that combatants 
are bound by the law’s directives.11 The harm-minimisation view thus fails to do justice to the laws of 
war, which qua law have as their constitutive aim to “guide human conduct through positive normative 
standards” (50). And, more urgently, it fails to address the problem of divergence that we started with. 
While it may resolve the tension between the law and morality of war from the perspective of the 
legislator (since it can explain why we ought to put in place laws whose content differs sharply from the 
applicable moral norms), it leaves the tension untouched from the perspective of the law’s subject. 
Combatants are still confronted with diverging legal and moral norms. The fact that the law reduces 
overall aggregate harm does not give combatants reasons why they specifically should follow the law, rather 
than try to follow the demands of morality. 
Haque thus sets out to offer an alternative account of the laws of war that vindicates the 
LOAC’s claim to authority and establishes that combatants have moral reasons to follow the law’s 
directives, even in cases where those directives depart from independent moral reasons. To do so, 
Haque adopts an instrumental approach, drawing on Joseph Raz’s influential ‘service conception’ of 
authority. An instrumental account of authority starts from the observation that, though we have 
ultimate reason to do what morality requires of us, we are often unable to conform to these ultimate 
reasons by pursuing such conformity directly. We are limited in all sorts of ways that affect our abilities 
to access those reasons, assess their force, and act in light of them. Given our limitations, we have 
																																																						
11 For a version of the harm-minimisation view which explicitly takes the latter to follow from former, see Henry Shue, 
“Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’?” in Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, eds. David Rodin and 
Henry Shue, 87-111 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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instrumental reasons to adopt means that will enable us to best approximate full conformity with the 
ultimate moral reasons.12 In some contexts, the optimal means will involve acting on one’s own 
assessment of the ultimate reasons at issue. But sometimes the best means will be to take a less direct 
route, such as letting the directives of another agent or institution settle how one acts. And in such 
cases, there is an instrumental reason for being bound by these directives, and acting accordingly.  
On this view, authorities have the power to give binding directives to their subjects because, 
and to the extent that, this power helps the subjects better achieve what they have independent reason 
to do. As Raz formulates this central idea (which he terms the ‘normal justification thesis’): 
 
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves 
showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to 
him . . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and 
tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly.13 
 
Authorities, Raz suggests, serve their subjects in four main ways. First, following a common authority 
can enable valuable coordination among subjects. Second, a policy of obedience can allow subjects to 
avoid the costs of complex deliberation. Third, an authority may possess greater expertise than the 
subject on some important matter. Fourth, deference to authority allows subjects to circumvent 
various deficiencies and vices that afflict their deliberations.  
Service accounts aim to explain the central features of authority outlined above: that subjects 
are (in at least some cases) bound by the authority’s directives even if those directives fail to reflect the 
balance of independent reasons (that is, the reasons the subject would have absent the authority’s 
directives). This is because authorities need not be infallible in order to successfully serve their 
subjects. The standard for service is essentially comparative: which of the available means for 
conforming to the ultimate moral reasons is superior? Even if the authority makes occasional mistakes, 
a policy of following its directives may be better than one of acting on one’s own assessment of the 
fundamental moral reasons if one’s own mistakes are more severe. Similarly, even if one sometimes 
gets the matter right where the authority goes wrong, a general policy of not second-guessing the 
																																																						
12 We say more about the relation between instrumental and moral reasons in Section 3 below.  
13 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 53. 
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authority may be superior, if one cannot reliably distinguish between cases where disagreement is due 
to the authority’s mistake or one’s own. Service accounts thus explain in a satisfyingly unified way 
how, when law and morality conflict, one can nonetheless have binding reason to follow the law. 
When an authority serves its subject, obedience is an indirect, but more effective, way for the subject 
to respond to the applicable moral reasons. As Haque puts it: 
 
…often we are more likely to satisfy the moral standards that apply to us, not by 
applying those standards, but instead by following a well-designed decision procedure. 
In such cases, we have decisive reason to adopt that decision-procedure rather than 
exercise our own (more fallible) moral judgment on a case-by-case basis. We may say 
that an act that is permissible under a rule or decision procedure that we have decisive 
reason to adopt is permissible in the instrumental sense. (45) 
 
The first step in Haque argument holds that the LOAC has authority to the extent that it satisfies the 
normal justification thesis:  
 
The LOAC claims that combatants should follow the law rather than their own moral 
judgment when the two conflict. According to the service conception, this claim is 
vindicated only to the extent that combatants will better conform to the moral reasons 
that apply to them by following the law than by trying to act directly on those reasons. 
If combatants will make morally better decisions by ignoring the law and relying on 
their own judgment, then they have decisive reason to do just that. (45-46) 
Haque’s second step is to argue that core aspects of the LOAC do satisfy this justificatory test.14 He 
focuses, in particular, on the law’s prohibition on targeting civilians and its non-prohibition on 
targeting combatants. On Haque’s view, these aspects of the law do provide a service to combatants, 
who are therefore bound to follow the LOAC’s rules.  
Though it is common to defend legal authority by appeal to its role in facilitating valuable 
coordination among many agents, Haque rejects this approach when it comes to the LOAC. This is 
																																																						
14 Haque’s proposal also has important reformist aspects: “We should defend, interpret, and develop the law of war by 
reference to the service view.” (LMW, 21) (emphasis added) 
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because, he explains, “in war we compete with our adversary, and our moral reasons do not depend 
on their behaviour. We can avoid targeting civilians, and have moral reason to do so, irrespective of 
how our adversary behaves.” (42) Haque instead adopts a broadly epistemic strategy to ground the 
LOAC’s authority: the law of war serves combatants by compensating for (i) their poor ability to make 
individualised judgments of combatant and non-combatant liability, and (ii) the susceptibility of those 
judgements to ‘non-rational’ forces, which include emotions (such as fear and hatred) as well as biases 
(such as underestimating one’s own fallibility and overestimating the wrongdoing of outgroup 
members). Given these epistemic deficiencies, Haque maintains that both just and unjust combatants 
will improve their moral performance by fighting in accordance with the laws of war, rather than 
acting on their own assessment of the moral reasons that apply.15  
Just combatants, by following a general rule that restricts intentional attacks to combatants, 
act wrongly less often than they would without the law’s guidance. There may well be cases in which 
the law permits targeting a non-liable soldier, or prohibits targeting a liable civilian. In these instances, 
following the law may lead just combatants away from what they have ultimate moral reason to do. 
But, Haque argues, given the relative infrequency of non-liable combatants and liable civilians, and 
the difficulty of identifying them, just combatants avoid wrongdoing in more cases by deferring to the 
law, compared to acting on their own assessment of individuals’ liability.  
The case of unjust combatants is less straightforward, since Haque accepts the reductivist 
claim that such combatants have no legitimate targets. Whether they kill combatants or civilians, unjust 
warriors will typically violate individuals’ rights not to be killed. However, Haque argues, though all of 
unjust combatants’ targeting options (short of ceasing to fight) involve grave moral wrongdoing, the 
laws of war may nonetheless provide an important service to them. Though unjust combatants violate 
basic rights whomever they kill, some violations are worse than others. Following Seth Lazar, Haque 
maintains that, other things being equal, it is morally worse to target innocent civilians than to target 
innocent combatants. This putative asymmetry is grounded in, for example: civilians’ greater 
																																																						
15 Haque focuses on the role authority plays in minimizing wrongdoing, rather than in improving conformity to reasons 
more generally, as Raz does. This may allow Haque to escape some worries that have been raised against Raz’s view. (See, 
e.g., Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Ch.4.) While we also limit 
ourselves to improving conformity to moral reasons, we do not assume that the authority must improve conformity with 
moral duties, for reasons that emerge in Section 3. 
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vulnerability to harm, their lesser capacity to defend themselves, and that combatants chose to make 
themselves lawful targets, often (at least partly) in order to draw fire away from civilians.16 This 
differential wrongness explains how the law can serve even unjust combatants. Combatants fighting 
unjust wars will indeed commit nothing but wrongs; yet they will commit less grave wrongs if they 
fight according to the laws of war, and thus concentrate their attacks on combatants rather than 
civilians, than they would if they instead relied on their own moral judgment to identify permissible 
targets.  
Haque’s overall project is thus to establish that: 
 
…by following the LOAC (suitably interpreted and developed) all combatants can 
ensure that they will fight, if not permissibly, then less wrongfully than they would 
otherwise. In other words, I hope to vindicate the LOAC’s claim to legitimate 
authority over just and unjust combatants alike. (49) 
 
If Haque’s ‘Service View’ of the LOAC is correct, then the puzzle about the relation between 
the law and morality of war can be resolved: the law of war deviates from the underlying 
morality, but it does so in order to improve combatant’s capacity to act on what morality 
requires. Combatants thus have reason to abide by the law, even if it deviates from the ultimate 
moral requirements governing killing and harming in war.  
In what follows, we criticise each step in Haque’s argument. We argue that the 
instrumental justificatory test invoked by Haque (and by many other legal and political theorists) 
sets too low a bar for authority. Once we apply the correct, more demanding test, it is much 
harder to vindicate the law’s authority in terms of the broadly epistemic service it provides to 
combatants. First, however, we clarify further the precise structure of instrumental accounts in 
general, and Haque’s argument in particular, by introducing, and responding to, two objections 
that may be raised to it. 
 
3. Instrumental Reasons to Obey and Moral Duties Not to Harm 
 
																																																						
16 Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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On Haque’s view, combatants are bound by the law’s directives for instrumental reasons: if a 
combatant follows the law’s directives, he will better conform to the moral reasons that govern killing 
and injuring. One objection to this proposal concerns the relation between an agent’s instrumental 
reasons and her fundamental moral reasons.  
An initial worry is that instrumental reasons are not genuinely moral reasons, and so cannot do 
the normative work required of them. But this concern can be addressed. The distinctions between 
moral and non-moral reasons, and between instrumental and non-instrumental ones, cut across one 
another. We have an instrumental reason to j when j-ing facilitates another action (y) that is 
independently worthwhile.17 When we have a moral reason or duty to y, we very often have derivative 
reason to undertake another, facilitative action (j) that enables us to conform to that reason or duty. 
The instrumental or facilitative reason we have then inherits its normative force from the ultimate 
moral reason or duty. So the reason to undertake the facilitative action is simultaneously instrumental 
and moral.  
But even with this clarification in place, one might still object that instrumental (moral) reasons 
are not of the right type to change combatants’ normative situation in the way Haque’s account seems 
to require. Consider the following example:  
 
Mistaken Soldier: Private and General believe their side is fighting a just war. In fact, it is seriously 
unjust. General’s view of which enemy soldiers it is necessary to kill to bring about victory is 
more fine-grained that Private’s. If Private obeys General’s directives about which enemy 
soldiers to kill, he will kill some enemy soldiers, but fewer than if he tries to pursue victory by 
acting on his own judgment.  
 
On Haque’s account, Private is under a duty to obey General: Private, by following General’s orders, 
will commit fewer wrongful acts than he would by trying to act on the underlying moral reasons 
directly. And yet that seems to have the counter-intuitive (indeed, contradictory) result that Private 
has binding moral reasons to kill some enemy soldiers, as well as a moral permission (albeit “in the 
																																																						
17 Cf. Joseph Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 1-28. 
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instrumental sense” (45)) to kill them, even though he is clearly under a moral duty not to kill any (and 
would intuitively become liable to blame, compensation, and defensive harm if he obeyed).18 
While we think this is a serious worry, we offer a diagnosis of the problem and a response on 
Haque’s behalf. First, we suggest that the problem with cases like Mistaken Soldier arises, not from the 
instrumental nature of the authority relation per se, but from its specifically remedial character. Second, 
we show that in remedial cases, the ‘instrumental’ (or ‘remedial’) permission must be understood very 
narrowly, bearing only on what considerations should guide Private’s deliberation, but not on Private’s 
ultimate moral duties (nor his liability to defensive harm, compensation, or blame).  
Instrumental reasons for action depend, by their very nature, on certain inabilities or 
deficiencies (in a very broad sense) of the agent. Omnipotent, omniscient, and non-akratic agents 
																																																						
18 This worry focuses on the moral character of Private’s reasons (and the corresponding moral valence of his action). 
Someone may also push back against the idea that Private’s obedience would be justified on instrumental grounds. Private 
has instrumental reason to obey because obedience facilitates conformity to his moral duty not to kill innocent people. 
But, the objection goes, Private could also adopt another option that is both clearly superior to disobedience and 
incompatible with it: he can simply not kill any innocent people. Yet if that alternative option is available to him, then how 
could his obedience be instrumentally justified?  The problem with this objection, however, is that is elides the distinction 
we introduce below between two types of capacities: those that bear on an agent’s fundamental moral reasons or duties, 
and those that bear on his instrumental reasons. We cannot here develop an account of which capacities fall on either side. 
But an example should help show that it would be very counter-intuitive to deny that someone in Private’s situation has 
instrumental reasons that flow from his ignorance of what he has moral reason to do: Imagine Sam promises his mother 
to turn off the light in her garage at 6pm sharp. But now it is 5.55pm, and while Sam remembers that he promised his 
mother something, he cannot remember what it is. He walks around the house trying to remember, and finds himself in the 
garage at 5.59. There is no question that he could turn off the light, in one morally relevant sense: turning the light switch 
would kill the light, he has the physical strength to turn it, etc. But there is also no question that, given his current ignorance 
of what he has a duty to do, he has good instrumental reason to walk back to the kitchen and call his mother to find out 
what he had promised her; and he has reason to do this even if, as a result, he doesn’t turn the switch at 6pm, but only at 
6.05. That he has an instrumental reason is shown, e.g., in how we might criticize him: not only for failing to turn off the 
light at 6pm sharp (which he promised), but also for standing in the garage pondering what to do when he could instead 
go to the kitchen and call his mother, thereby minimizing how far he falls short of fulfilling his promissory duty. 
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would have no instrumental reason to adopt facilitative actions, since they can comply with their 
ultimate reasons directly. Only imperfect agents like us have instrumental reasons. But not all of our 
deficiencies are morally on a par. Some deficiencies or inabilities are part of the background against 
which our moral duties are determined in the first place: if we could run as fast as a race-car, or 
perform calculations as quickly as a super-computer, or knew the entire human genome, we might 
have duties to save others (because doing so would be feasible and relatively costless for us) that we 
currently lack. Yet other deficiencies are not part of the background, and do not stand in the way of 
our having certain moral duties. Instead they simply prevent us from doing what we in fact have a 
moral duty to do. Call the latter ‘moral deficiencies’. Where an instrumental action serves to remedy 
moral deficiencies, we will call the subject’s reasons for action ‘morally remedial’, or ‘remedial’ for 
short. 
Our concern here is not to develop an account of which deficiencies fall into either category, 
but merely to flag that, insofar as one accepts that there are different categories, this has important 
implications for the normative effects of instrumentally justified authority.19 To show this, we consider 
first a non-remedial instance of authority. In non-remedial cases, an instrumentally grounded 
																																																						
19 There is an extensive literature on the relation between (in)capacities and moral reasons, and the associated question 
what it takes for moral considerations to be ‘available’ or ‘accessible’ to an agent so as to affect what reasons she has. We 
take the limited claims we need for our argument here to be compatible with a wide variety of positions within this 
literature, and so largely abstain from discussing it in detail. First, while we assume (because we find most plausible) that 
what moral reasons we have is partly dependent on (some of) our capacities, this assumption is not in fact necessary for 
our central argumentative purposes. (For a recent defence of the assumption’s plausibility, see Errol Lord, “Acting for the 
Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, 26-52 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).) The crucial contrast we wish to draw, between how fundamental moral reasons and instrumental 
reasons are respectively affected by deficiencies, would stand even if moral reasons were independent of our capacities. 
Second, while we assume that we can (and often do) have moral duties that we are ignorant of, even those who believe 
that ignorance and similar epistemic deficiencies about our moral reasons can limit what moral reasons or duties we have 
should not wish to deny that some moral duties apply to us even if we are currently ignorant of them. For a general 
discussion of the link between capacities and reasons, see Bart Streumer, “Reasons and Abilities,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star, 233-254 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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permission need not be in tension with our moral duties, even when the moral stakes are high. For at 
least sometimes the instrumentally beneficial intervention of an authority properly changes what moral 
reasons or duties we have, by changing the very considerations on which our moral duties depend. 
Consider the following example:  
 
Beach Savior: Ben goes for a stroll on the beach when he spots three people drowning. 
Swimmers 1 and 2 are some distance from the shore. The beach is known for its treacherous 
undercurrents. Though there is a hidden underwater sandbank that Ben could safely take to 
reach the two, he is non-culpably ignorant of where that sandbank is. As a result, saving 
Swimmers 1 and 2 would be quite dangerous. Given the risk, Ben is under no moral duty to 
save them. Swimmer 3, however, is very close to the beach, and Ben can easily save him. So 
Ben has a moral duty to save Swimmer 3.  
 
But before Ben saves Swimmer 3, Old Rick appears on the beach. He is in a wheelchair, and 
so cannot himself engage in any rescue. But he is an expert on local currents and sandbanks. 
If Ben follows Old Rick’s directives, he can walk along the hidden sandbank to reach 
Swimmers 1 and 2, and save them in an essentially riskless fashion. However, if he follows 
Old Rick’s directives and saves Swimmers 1 and 2, he won’t have time to save Swimmer 3, 
who will drown.  
 
In this case, Old Rick plausibly acquires instrumentally justified authority over Ben, since following 
his directives helps Ben act on certain moral reasons (though not duties) he has anyway (to save lives). 
By issuing directives, Old Rick changes the underlying distribution of benefits and burdens associated 
with Ben’s options (by making saving the greater number relatively costless), and thereby also changes 
Ben’s moral duties and permissions. As a result of Old’ Rick’s authority, Ben acquires a moral duty to 
save Swimmers 1 and 2, and loses the duty he had to save Swimmer 3. The intuitive problem we 
encountered in the case of Mistaken Soldier is absent here. 
Contrast this with a variation on the case, in which obedience to authority is remedial:  
 
Beach Bum: The situation is as in Beach Savior, except that the potential rescuer is Bella, the 
lifeguard on duty. If Bella knew the location of the hidden sandbank, she would have enough 
time to first save Swimmers 1 and 2, and then rescue Swimmer 3. But Bella doesn’t know 
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where the sandbank is. The location was part of her mandatory lifeguard training, but she was 
too lazy to show up to that particular training session. If she follows Old Rick’s directives, she 
will be able to walk along the sandbank (though more slowly than if she had learned about its 
location herself) and save Swimmers 1 and 2. By the time she has saved them, however, 
Swimmer 3 will have drowned.  
 
Both Bella and Ben have the same basic deficiency: ignorance of the location of the sandbank. And 
both are morally bound to obey Old Rick’s directives, because obedience enables them to compensate 
for that deficiency and rescue Swimmers 1 and 2, though this requires letting Swimmer 3 drown. 
However, there is an important moral difference between the cases. Unlike Ben, Bella still intuitively 
violates a duty she had to Swimmer 3. This is reflected in our judgment that she is blameworthy for 
his death, and that she is liable to pay compensation (and potentially suffer defensive harm, if it were 
possible to protect Swimmer 3 by harming Bella). Insisting that Bella had a duty to protect Swimmer 
3 is nonetheless compatible with saying that Bella is bound by Old Rick’s directives, and would do 
something wrong if she failed to be guided by them – even though being so guided will effectively 
make it impossible for her to save Swimmer 3. Given Bella’s ignorance of where the sandbank is, the 
best she can do is to rescue the two swimmers while letting the third drown.  
In light of such examples we suggest that the ‘instrumental permission’ that Haque invokes 
may come in two varieties. In non-remedial cases, it may indeed change the subject’s fundamental 
moral duties. But in remedial cases, like Bella’s, it plays a much narrower normative role. While those 
subject to remedial authority are permitted to obey authoritative directives even if this results in 
violating others’ rights, such permissions do nothing to extinguish the duties correlative to these rights, 
nor shield the subject from blame, or liability to pay compensation or suffer defensive harm, for the 
violation. The relevant permission instead merely bears on how the subject ought to be guided in her 
deliberation by the directives. 
What about cases like Mistaken Soldier? Private, we assume, fails to fully respect the innocent 
enemy’s rights because his “beliefs are unreliable, the available evidence is incomplete or misleading, 
or [his] moral reasoning is distorted by emotion or bias” (45). Given these deficiencies, the best that 
Private can do is to be guided by General’s directives. When Private is so guided, he ought to treat the 
option of killing those he is ordered to target as permissible, even though they in fact have a right 
against being killed. He ought to do so because unless he does, he cannot effectively be guided by 
General’s directives, and – the assumption is – will end up killing more innocent people. But this, we 
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have seen, need not be incompatible with Private’s violating the rights of his opponents (and being 
liable to be blamed, defensively harmed, and forced to pay compensation), as long as we recognize 
that General’s authority is remedial only. 
The intuitively problematic character of Mistaken Soldier thus rests, not on the instrumental 
justification of General’s authority, but on its remedial quality. Such remedial authority must be 
understood to have only very modest normative implications. These implications are, however, 
sufficient for Haque’s specific purposes; for what he seeks to establish is that soldiers have moral 
reason to be guided by the LOAC’s directives when determining whom to target in war.  
	
4. Authority, Deficiencies, and Options 
 
We now turn to Haque’s discussion of the conditions under which authority is justified, and so has 
the normative implications identified in the previous section. At the heart of Haque’s view is the idea 
that subjects effectively face a choice between two different means for conforming to morality’s 
demands. One means (M1) is to consider the underlying moral reasons, form a corresponding 
judgment about what course of action they require, and act on it. Another (M2) is to consider an 
authority’s directives, form a judgment about what the directive requires, and act according to that 
(even if, by the subject’s own independent assessment of the underlying moral reasons, another action 
seems superior). The subject ought to adopt M2, and thus be guided by the authority’s directives, if, 
by trying to follow the authority’s directives, the subject will do better than she would if she instead 
adopted M1, and tried to act directly on the underlying moral reasons.  
This section has two aims. The first is to clarify the background conditions that enter into 
making the appropriate comparison between M1 and M2. The second is to argue that the comparison 
between M1 and M2 is not sufficient to establish that the subject ought to be guided by the authority’s 
directives on instrumental grounds.  
When making the comparison between M1 and M2, we must consider how well the agent 
would do when trying to follow the authority’s directives or the underlying moral reasons respectively. 
And how well the subject will do when trying to follow them will depend on various actual capacities 
or deficiencies that she has: if she is ignorant of her moral duties, or tends to give inadequate weight 
to some of them, then this will shape how effectively trying to follow them will translate into actually 
conforming to them. But, similarly, how good the subject is at understanding the authority’s directives, 
or figuring out what course of action they require of her, will determine how effectively the subject’s 
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being guided by the authority translates into the subject’s conforming to the underlying moral duties. 
Thus the instrumental argument must treat as a baseline certain deficiencies; and an argument for 
being guided by the authority must depend on the thought that the authority’s guidance is effective 
despite the subject’s deficiencies (most obviously – though not exclusively – the deficiencies that make 
simply being guided by the underlying moral reasons an ineffective strategy for achieving actual 
conformity to these reasons). Any instrumental justification of authority must thus be deficiency-
compatible. As Jeremy Waldron points out, in the context of war the law must be “administrable” at the 
hands of imperfect, morally deficient combatants if it is to actually help these combatants to overcome 
or compensate for their shortcomings.20 
We want to emphasize again here that the deficiencies that determine whether the subject has 
instrumental reason to be guided by the authority must be distinguished from those deficiencies that 
determine what fundamental moral duties or reasons the subject has. Bella’s culpable ignorance of how 
to save all three swimmers, for example, did not undo her fundamental moral duty to save all three, 
or her corresponding liability to be blamed, suffer defensive harm, etc. But it did bear on what 
instrumental reason she had in light of this fundamental duty: in this case, a reason to follow another’s 
directives so as to (at least partially) make up for her own (culpable) deficiency. Moreover, Bella’s 
deficiency not only gave her reason to adopt indirect means, but also reason to adopt indirect means 
that are in fact compatible with her deficiency, and thus actually useful for her. 
Let us turn to the second point. Haque, we saw, seeks to establish authority by comparing M1 
and M2. In this he follows Raz’s influential formulation of the normal justification thesis, which 
compares how the subject acts “if he accepts the directives … as authoritatively binding and tries to 
follow them” to how he would act if he tried “to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.”21 
Haque, in the same vein, writes that the law has legitimate authority if “individuals who conform to 
the law … perform fewer or less wrongful objectively impermissible acts than they would by relying 
on their own moral judgment.” (48)  
																																																						
20 Jeremy Waldron, “Deep Morality and the Laws of War,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, eds. Seth Lazar and 
Helen Frowe, 80-98 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). For a more general discussion of this point, and the role it 
plays in expertise-based justifications of political authority, see Daniel Viehoff, “Authority and Expertise,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 24 (2016): 406-426. 
21 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 53. 
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We suggest that this comparison is insufficient to establish the instrumental justification of 
authority that Haque is after. Such justification also requires a comparison between how the subject 
would do if she were guided by the authority’s directives (M2), and how she would do if she adopted 
another compensatory strategy (M3) that is compatible with her deficiencies.  
Call the view according to which authority is justified as long as M2 is superior to M1 the 
‘narrow’ instrumental justification, and the alternative view (requiring comparison between M1, M2, 
and M3) the ‘wide’ version. The narrow version, we suggest, has implausible results. For it implies 
that a subject who could improve her conformity with reason even more by ignoring an authority that 
satisfies the narrow version, and instead following some other strategy that even more effectively 
compensates for her deficiencies, yet is incompatible with obedience to the authority, would still be 
bound by the authority’s directives. It is hard to see how the binding force of the authority’s directives 
would be instrumentally justified in this case.22 To illustrate, consider: 
 
Ambulance Driver: Dean the Ambulance Driver is good, but not perfect, at driving fast on busy 
roads. He gets excited when driving fast, which negatively impacts his concentration and 
judgement. If he drives according to his own judgement, he poses riskn of killing pedestrians. 
But if he obeys the directives of Vicky the Radio Controller, who directs him along less busy 
streets, he will pose riskm (where riskm<riskn). However, if he listens to soothing music on his 
headphones, he will be unable to hear Vicky but will be less prone to excitement. If Dean 
drives while using his headphones he will pose riskp (where riskp<riskm).  
 
According to the narrow version of the instrumental justification, Dean is morally bound to obey 
Vicky’s directives. But this is clearly the wrong verdict. We should compare all of Dean’s available 
options for compensating for his risk-imposing excitement, and conclude that he should ignore Vicky 
and put on his headphones. Indeed, Raz’s more recent discussions of authority indicate that he 
recognizes the need for the wider justification. For as Raz points out, if an agent is confronted with 
two would-be authorities, each of whom would improve her reliability, but not both of whom can be 
																																																						
22 On this point, see Patrick Durning, “Joseph Raz and the Instrumental Justification of the Duty to Obey the Law,” Law 
and Philosophy 22 (2003): 597-620; Matthew Coakley, “On the Value of Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 
10 (2010): 345-369.  
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followed simultaneously, then the agent is bound only by the directives of the better of the two.23 This 
point generalizes to authority-independent means: if, instead of acting on my own judgment or 
following the authority, I could listen to soothing music (or follow some other rule, etc.), and doing 
that would lead to a superior outcome, then that is what I have instrumental reason to do.  
It should be clear that whether a subject has a relevant option M3 that is superior to either M2 
or M1 will also depend on whether trying to act in accordance with M3 (say, following another rule 
than that promulgated by the authority) will be effective in improving the subject’s moral conformity 
despite his deficiencies. In other words, M3 too must be deficiency-compatible. This significantly 
restricts the range of alternative means that are admissible into the authority-determining comparison. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the deficiency-compatibility restriction does 
not entail that we should only compare what actually happens if the subject is not guided by the 
authority with what happens if he tried to be so guided (and conclude, on the basis of the latter’s 
superiority, that the authority is instrumentally justified). Imagine, for example, that Dean is aware of 
the compensatory benefits of using his headphones, but can’t be bothered to do so. He is, however, 
willing to obey Vicky’s directives. (Call this variation Lazy Ambulance Driver.) If Dean is not guided by 
authority, what will actually happen is that he drives according to his own judgement. But despite the 
fact that obeying Vicky is superior compared to what Dean will actually do, the accessibility of a 
superior option (using his headphones) undermines his being instrumentally bound to obey her. More 
generally, the subject has instrumental reason to adopt M3 instead of M2 as long as, if he tried to follow 
that alternative rule, he would in fact do better than if he tried to follow the authority’s directives instead. 
If given his deficiencies the subject would do better, instrumentally, if he tried to follow the alternative 
strategy, rather than to follow the authority’s directives, then it would be instrumentally rational to 
follow that strategy. 
	
5. The Options of Combatants 
 
Haque’s attempt to vindicate the law’s authority over just and unjust combatants assumes the narrow 
reading of the instrumental justification (which compares combatants’ moral performance under only 
two conditions: if they follow the LOAC and if they act on their own judgement). We argue next that 
once we apply the correct, and more demanding, wide reading of the instrumental justification 
																																																						
23 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 143. 
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introduced in the previous section, Haque’s defence for the LOAC’s authority becomes much less 
plausible. In particular, it becomes possible that just combatants would not best be guided by the 
LOAC; it becomes doubtful that unjust combatants will best be guided by the LOAC on the grounds 
that Haque adduces; and it becomes unlikely that just and unjust combatants will each best be guided 
by rules with the same content.  
We start with the case of just combatants. In line with the narrow justification, Haque’s 
argument regarding just combatants compares how many wrongful killings they will perform if they 
adopt a policy of obeying the law’s strict prohibition on targeting non-combatants, or if they try to 
use their own judgement to assess the liability of potential civilian targets in each choice scenario. 
Haque argues that combatants will perform fewer wrongful killings if they follow the former strategy 
than the latter, and that in virtue of this superiority the LOAC has authority. This is true even though, 
by following the law, combatants will have to forsake opportunities to advance just goals (and thereby 
protect innocent people) by means of targeting liable civilians. 
But once we introduce the wider version of the instrumental argument, we must also compare 
other strategies that just combatants could use to compensate for their deficiencies (which, for Haque, 
are their epistemic deficiencies with respect to identifying liable civilians). If such strategies are 
available, then the laws of war may lack authority over them after all. 
Moreover, there are reasons to think that such strategies are available. When it comes to 
targeting civilians, following one’s own assessment of the permissibility of targeting civilians in every 
case is not the only alternative to following the law’s strict prohibition. Another option for just 
combatants may be to adopt a policy of following a prohibition in most cases, but not in cases where 
the liability of a civilian is relatively clear. Instrumental accounts of authority often include such an 
exception24, and Haque accepts that they obtain with respect to other aspects of the LOAC. (For 
example, he argues that just combatants should ignore the law’s non-prohibition on targeting 
combatants when it is obvious that a combatant performs a non-combat role.25) It doesn’t seem 
implausible that by following a limited prohibition of this type, just combatants will strike a morally 
superior balance between avoiding targeting non-liable people and protecting innocents from unjust 
																																																						
24 See, e.g., Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 61-62. 
25 LMW, 45 and 86. 
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attack.26 If so, then the law’s exceptionless prohibition lacks authority for just combatants, because it 
fails to satisfy the wide version of the instrumental justification, even if it satisfies Haque’s narrow 
version. 
Haque may reply here that the moral risk of targeting civilians is sufficiently high that following 
an exceptionless prohibition is superior to any available alternative strategy, and the law’s prohibition 
thus in fact satisfies the wide justificatory test as well. But the extent of this risk varies greatly across 
different theories of civilian liability. If the correct theory holds that liability is distributed quite widely 
among certain categories of relatively identifiable civilians (for example, those who work in war-related 
heavy industries), then the moral risk of targeting does not seem high enough to justify the law’s 
prohibition.27 Haque himself proposes a complex account of civilian liability that is highly restrictive. 
His view places a lot of weight on the distinction between posing a direct unjust threat oneself and 
contributing to unjust threats posed by others, and argues that the latter is rarely a ground of liability 
to defensive killing.28 Though ingenious, Haque’s view is controversial and open to important 
objections.29 To the extent that civilian liability is more widespread than Haque allows, the law’s service 
to just combatants is correspondingly weakened.   
It is also worth flagging a second problem with Haque’s argument that emerges from 
reflection on the case of just combatants. Haque’s overarching aim is to do justice to the LOAC as 
law; and as he explains, law has as its constitutive aim to “guide human conduct through positive 
normative standards” (50). Justifying a law’s authority thus not only requires establishing that its 
content makes a moral difference to what its putative subject ought to do. It also requires showing 
that that fact that this content is posited or promulgated by an authority makes an essential contribution to 
that change in the subject’s normative situation.  
																																																						
26 For further discussion of this idea, in the context of non-international armed conflicts, see Christopher Finlay’s 
contribution to this symposium. 
27 See Frowe, Defensive Killing, Chs.6-8. For a different kind of argument in support of broad civilian liability, see Victor 
Tadros, “Orwell’s Battle with Brittain: Vicarious Liability for Unjust Aggression,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2014): 
42-77. 
28 LMW, Ch.3 and Appendix. 
29 For trenchant criticism, see Helen Frowe’s contribution to this symposium.  
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Despite his stated ambitions, Haque’s own account of how the law changes what combatants 
(and perhaps especially just combatants) ought to do makes remarkably little reference to positive 
normative standards. Haque’s argument does not show that just combatants should follow the law, 
even if it occasionally misleads them. Instead it shows only they should follow a rule with a specific content; 
and his argument for this seems completely detached from whether the law, or any other positive 
norm, promulgates that rule. Even if there were no law, or other positive social norm, requiring just 
combatants not to target civilians, each of them would – on Haque’s account – have reason to adopt 
a rule of his own to this effect, given that this would minimize the risk of wrongdoing. The fact that 
the prohibition on targeting civilians has the status of law seems to add nothing to the instrumental 
justification of its bindingness.  
Now there may be ways in which Haque’s account could accommodate this concern. Perhaps 
the fact that the rule has been suitably posited (say, via social or legal conventions or agreements) 
makes it especially likely that the rule is one worth adopting, or makes following the rule especially 
easy. If so, then the fact that there are positive norms prohibiting targeting civilians may be relevant 
after all; and so if these positive norms had articulated another rule, combatants would have reason 
to follow that rule instead (at least within certain limits). But nothing Haque says provides support for 
this line of thought.  
Indeed, Haque’s actual argument for the instrumental value of following a rule against 
targeting civilians threatens to effectively undermine any such argument for the bindingness of the 
rule qua positive normative standard. His account of the benefit of following the rule rests solely on 
the rule’s content, and not on its being posited. Furthermore, recognition of the rule’s usefulness (at 
least as Haque presents it) requires only the observation that many civilians are non-liable, and the 
further thought that we have stringent reason to minimize the risk of targeting non-liable civilians by 
mistake. But then, if just combatants are offered a choice between following posited legal or social 
rules governing the targeting of civilians, and instead adopting the particular rule of not targeting 
civilians at all, it is unclear what reason they could have to do the former rather than the latter. In 
particular, since posited rules can go wrong, simply adopting the relevant substantive rule directly may 
be presumptively superior. But then Haque’s argument, even if it establishes the bindingness of a rule 
such as that posited by the laws of war, does not establish, and in fact undermines, the bindingness of 
the laws of war as positive norms.  
Next consider the case of unjust combatants. Haque’s argument is, remember, as follows: 
Unjust combatants typically commit a serious moral wrong by fighting, since both the enemy 
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combatants and the enemy civilians are morally innocent. Still, it is a greater wrong to kill civilians 
than to kill even innocent armed enemy soldiers. So the unjust combatant will “perform fewer or less 
wrongful objectively impermissible acts” by obeying the LOAC and targeting only enemy combatants 
“than they would by relying on their own moral judgment” of whom to target (48).  
But as the previous section showed, comparing these options isn’t enough to establish the 
authority of the LOAC’s prohibition on targeting civilians. Following the LOAC must also be superior 
to alternative deficiency-compatible strategies the subject could adopt. To determine whether such a 
strategy may be available, we must get clearer on how the LOAC’s directives differ from unjust 
combatants’ fundamental moral reasons, and thus what moral downsides there could be to following 
the LOAC as an unjust combatant. 
The most obvious way in which the LOAC’s rules deviate from an unjust soldier’s moral 
obligations is that the LOAC explicitly prohibits targeting civilians, but does not equally prohibit 
targeting enemy combatants. By contrast, as a matter of morality, the unjust soldier is under a duty 
not to kill either. One might think that this divergence is no reason for concern: as Haque emphasizes, 
the LOAC, though it prohibits killing civilians, does not create a moral permission, let alone a moral 
duty, to kill enemy combatants.30 (In this regard, the LOAC’s authority may seem much less 
problematic than General’s authority in Mistaken Soldier.) And since the prohibition on killing civilians 
simply reiterates an existing moral duty unjust soldiers have, the law, one may think, cannot make 
things morally worse.  
But this is too quick. True, the LOAC does not change that the unjust soldier has a duty not 
to kill either enemy combatants or civilians. But it does change the comparative significance that these 
considerations have in his deliberation. Even if the unjust soldier has a duty to target neither enemy 
combatants nor civilians, the question arises how, if he will nonetheless target someone, he ought to choose 
his target. It is here that the LOAC crucially deviates from the underlying moral reasons. The LOAC 
categorically prohibits targeting civilians, but does not similarly prohibit killing soldiers; and so an 
unjust soldier who is guided by the LOAC will, when choosing between targeting soldiers and 
targeting civilians, always do the former.  
Compare this to what one would expect morality to advise. Haque holds that it is morally 
worse to kill enemy civilians than enemy combatants if both are innocent; and so the unjust soldier’s 
																																																						
30 “The law of armed conflict (LOAC) does not tell combatants what they may do, only what they may not do.” LMW, 
31. 
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targeting decisions should reflect this. Like Haque’s highly restrictive account of civilian liability, this 
is a controversial view. Some simply deny that considerations like vulnerability, defenceless, choice of 
risk exposure, etc. have independent moral significance. Others, more subtly, argue that the 
significance of these considerations applies only to just combatants: while it may be true that it is 
harder to justify targeting innocent civilians rather than innocent combatants, it is not worse to 
unjustifiably target innocent civilians rather than innocent combatants.31 But even if we follow Haque 
in accepting that killing innocent civilians is generally morally worse than killing innocent combatants, 
it is not plausibly so much worse that we must target the latter instead of the former no matter their respective 
number.32 So there will be a point at which an unjust combatant will commit a less severe wrong by 
targeting a small number of innocent civilians instead of many innocent soldiers.33 
This observation, in turn, suggests that there may in principle be another rule that would 
provide better guidance to unjust combatants than the LOAC. To minimize the wrongfulness of one’s 
targeting decisions, a rule allowing for certain trade-offs between combatants and civilians might be 
superior.34 So to explain why unjust combatants should follow the LOAC’s directives rather than such 
an alternative rule (or at least to explain this within the structure of his own theory), Haque would 
have to argue that unjust combatants cannot reliably be guided by such an alternative rule given their 
ignorance, biases, and similar deficiencies.  
But it is unclear why such a rule would be deficiency-incompatible. Consider, for instance, a 
rule that prohibits targeting civilians except if the alternative is targeting a much larger number of 
enemy combatants. Like the LOAC, such a rule would not require the combatants to rely on their 
own moral judgment of the moral liability of different people. Instead it would (again like the LOAC) 
																																																						
31 Victor Tadros, “The Moral Distinction Between Combatants and Non-Combatants: Vulnerable and Defenceless,” Law 
and Philosophy 37 (2018): 289-312. See also Helen Frowe’s contribution to this symposium.  
32 The numbers-sensitivity of the putative asymmetry is emphasized in Yitzhak Benbaji, “The Lesser-Evil Dilemma for 
Sparing Civilians,” Law and Philosophy 37 (2018): 243-267. 
33 Interestingly, Haque makes just such an observation about the harm-minimization view (LMW, 40). But, as we argue, 
his own response – that killing civilians is intrinsically morally worse than killing even innocent combatants – fails to 
establish that the laws of war should “strictly limit[] the more wrongful killings” (41). 
34 This is compatible with Haque’s claim that the asymmetrical worseness of killing innocent combatants and civilians 
renders unjustified a targeting rule that requires combatants to simply minimise the number of innocents they kill.  
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merely require them to distinguish between combatants and civilians, as well as the relative number 
of each who would be targeted. Such a rule would be effective only if combatants could be motivated 
to draw the relevant distinction, and act on it. But the same is true with regard to the LOAC. The 
alternative rule would require a judgment of proportionality that is absent where the combatant simply 
follows the LOAC’s prohibition on targeting civilians. But what reason is there for thinking that 
soldiers will generally go awry here, and do so specifically in ways that lead to more wrongful action?  
Indeed, this alternative rule seem no more demanding than Haque’s interpretation of the standard in 
bello proportionality rule (which requires combatants to compare the amount of harm they will 
collaterally inflict on enemy civilians with the anticipated reduction in harm to combatants and 
civilians on their own side35). 
Perhaps the problem is not that unjust combatants could not apply the rule if they tried to 
follow it, but that even trying to follow it is incompatible with what may seem like their most 
fundamental deficiency: their mistaken belief in the justice of their own cause. Given this deficiency, 
it might be proposed, unjust combatants cannot help themselves to the benefits of rules that provide 
otherwise optimal guidance to them if those rules deviate from those for just combatants. And so 
pointing to the in-principle superiority of rules such as the ones we discussed does not show that the 
LOAC lacks authority for unjust combatants, because these alternative rules fail to satisfy deficiency-
compatibility. 
Yet this pleasingly simple objection rests on a mistaken assumption. As Haque himself 
helpfully observes, combatants may have a wide variety of views regarding the justice of their cause: 
“They may doubt that they fight for a just cause, or that war was necessary or proportionate. They 
may suspect that justice favors their adversary, or that justice condemns both parties. Nevertheless, 
they may choose to fight in order to protect their friends, families, and communities from the 
consequences of their government’s decision to go to war. The LOAC must speak to these 
combatants as well, by showing them that, even in an unjust war, there are rules worth following.” 
(48) But, by the argument sketched earlier, those combatants who in fact recognize the injustice of 






their expected wrongdoing by following the LOAC rather than adopting another set of rules that does 
not strictly prohibit targeting civilians.36  
We have argued that both just and unjust combatants are less likely to have instrumental 
reasons to follow the LOAC’s rules on targeting civilians than Haque’s argument suggests. But just as 
crucial is a third, and final, point: it is highly doubtful that just and unjust combatants will be under 
the authority of the same rules if, as Haque assumes, the function of these rules is to correct 
combatants’ epistemic deficiencies and help them minimize the wrongfulness of their targeting 
choices. The discussion of just and unjust soldiers has already suggested as much: while just 
combatants might do best following the LOAC, or perhaps to adopt a rule requiring careful 
discrimination between liable and non-liable civilians, unjust combatants would do best adopting a 
rule that requires, not discrimination among civilians, but targeting civilians only if doing to is the 
alternative to targeting a much greater number of enemy combatants. But in fact the problem emerges 
from the basic structure of Haque’s argument, with its focus on overcoming combatants’ epistemic 
deficiencies and biases. Because their respective moral situation is fundamentally different, it would 
seem enormously surprising if just and unjust combatants each had reason to be guided by the same 
rule. We are not denying that it is conceivable that the best rule that unjust combatants can be guided 
by, given their particular deficiencies and moral duties, and the best rule that just combatants can be 
guided by, given their own deficiencies and moral duties, just happen to be the same. But if this is so, 
it seems highly contingent given the structure of Haque’s argument – much more contingent than one 
might have expected given how central the symmetry between just and unjust soldiers is to the LOAC.  
Importantly, the difficulty of accommodating the law’s symmetry is not internal to 
instrumental justifications as such. Instead it follows from Haque’s specific articulation of the 
mechanism by which the LOAC improves combatants’ conformity to moral reasons.  
The problem could, for example, be avoided if the LOAC’s role were not to guide combatants 
as to their respective moral duties, but rather to make combatants’ choices interdependent in ways 
that enable both just and unjust soldiers to achieve morally superior outcomes. Haque rejects 
this possibility, recall, on the grounds that war is a competitive rather than cooperative endeavour, 
																																																						
36 Note that our argument is not restricted to those combatants who are aware (or suspect) that their overall war is 
unjustified. It also applies to those who are aware (or suspect) that they are participating in an unjustified phase or 
component of a war.  
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and so one side’s “moral reasons do not depend on [the other side’s] behaviour.” (42) But the 
inference from competition to moral independence is premature. It is true that, qua competitors, the 
warring parties are not pursuing some joint end around which they can orientate their deliberation. 
But cooperation so understood is not the only form of interdependence that matters. For even if 
competitors are not pursuing a joint end, they may be able to shape, through their actions, their 
opponent’s choices for the better.  
For instance, my adversary may (for good or bad reasons) be more likely to abstain from 
attacking my civilians if I abstain from attacking his, at least if my abstention is easily publicly 
recognizable. A scenario where I abstain from attacking his civilians, and he abstains from attacking 
mine, is superior to one in which we each attack the other’s civilians. But this does not mean that we 
share an end, and act cooperatively. For this symmetrical restraint is in principle morally inferior to 
one in which the just side attacks liable civilians (if necessary to prevent sufficiently great harm to 
innocents), while the unjust side attacks no civilians. If I take my adversary to be fighting an unjust 
war, then my end is to prevent the killing of what I consider innocent people (primarily, but not 
exclusively, on my side). Yet I also think that some enemy civilians are not innocent, but liable to 
suffer harm. So my choice whether to kill or spare those civilians is ultimately a matter of which means 
most effectively advances my end. The converse applies to my opponent. So we do not share ends 
(my ends, as I understand them, and my enemy’s ends, as he understands them, are in principle in 
competition). And yet our respective ends are best pursued by making our choices interdependent, 
such that each side contributes to the other’s end as a means for realizing its own: I abstain from 
killing what I think are his liable civilians, so as to motivate him not to kill my civilians (whom I deem 
innocent); and he abstains from killing what he thinks are my liable civilians, so as to motivate me not 
to kill his (whom he considers innocent).  
Where interdependence of this sort exists, public binding rules such as the LOAC may serve 
the parties, not by correcting their epistemic shortcomings or biases, but by extending their 
options. In particular a public binding rule may make it possible to effectively signal one’s willingness 
to take off the table the choice to target enemy civilians, and thus help make it more likely that the 
other party will do the same. Our point is not here to defend such a view (though we find it quite 
attractive). It is simply to flag that such a view could both ground the LOAC’s authority in 
instrumental considerations, and easily account for the symmetrical character of the LOAC’s rules, in 
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ways that Haque’s account, with its focus on the individualized epistemic deficiencies of very 
differently situated parties, cannot.37  
 
6. Conclusion: Authority and Justification Revisited 
 
We have argued that an instrumental justification of the sort proposed by Haque can establish the 
law’s authority only if it satisfies more demanding conditions than Haque recognizes; and that Haque’s 
argument consequently fails to vindicate the LOAC’s claim to authority over all (or even most) 
combatants in war. Given the availability of superior strategies for improving their moral performance, 
many combatants are not genuinely served by the LOAC’s authority, at least on the grounds Haque 
adduces.	
If one accepts this conclusion regarding the law’s authority, must one also conclude that the 
current laws of war should be done away with, or at least condemned? No. One could defend the 
LOAC’s authority on other grounds (such as the ones very briefly sketched at the end of Section 5). 
But let’s assume instead that no such alternative vindication of the LOAC’s authority succeeds. Even 
then, the laws of war we currently have may be worth keeping, and partly for reasons that flow from 
Haque’s own argument.  As we discussed in Section 2, which laws ought to be supported is distinct 
from the question which laws have authority, and for whom. An institution may lack authority (or, 
more relevant for our purposes, lack authority over at least some of its purported subjects) and yet be 
justified. Whether it is depends (among other things) on the institution’s effects on the behaviour of 
its subjects.  	
One possibility is that an institution has genuine authority over some subjects, in virtue of 
optimally improving their moral performance, but its effect on the remaining subjects is sufficiently 
suboptimal that its authority is all-things-considered disvaluable. This disvalue gives us moral reasons 
																																																						
37 There are obvious similarities between the view we sketch and the harm minimization view that Haque finds wanting. 
But Haque’s objection to that view is that, by itself, it does not establish combatants’ duty to follow the laws, since it does 
not consider combatants’ particular moral reasons. We grant this. Our point is that we can add to this view an account of 
the moral reasons that individual combatants have (and take themselves to have), such that combatants have reason to 
follow rules that help minimize the overall harm to civilians, both on their and the other side.   
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(or even duties) to remove or reform the institution, despite its legitimate authority. Call this normative 
property Unjustified Legitimate Authority.	
To illustrate, consider: 	
 	
Double Ambulance Driver: Vicky the Radio Controller is tasked with directing two ambulance 
drivers to the scene of an accident, using the single emergency radio frequency that all 
ambulances use. The fastest route is through a busy part of downtown packed with 
pedestrians. Sarah the Ambulance Driver is very skilled, though not perfect, at driving fast on 
busy roads. If Vicky issues directives that carefully guide Sarah through the downtown streets, 
Sarah can make it to the accident while posing an acceptably small risk of killing a pedestrian. 
Jim the Ambulance Driver has average driving skills, but he is mistakenly convinced that his 
skills rival Sarah’s. If Jim hears Vicky’s directives to Sarah over the radio, he will also be guided 
by them and take the downtown route. If he does so, he is very likely to kill a pedestrian. Vicky 
directs Sarah to take the downtown route.	
 	
In this case, Sarah is morally bound to obey Vicky’s directives, since they enable her to improve her 
conformity with her moral duties. But Vicky would not be justified in issuing those directives, since 
doing so would overall impose an unacceptable risk on pedestrians via their effect on Jim. 	
Are the laws of war unjustified in this sense? This depends on the costs of their existence. Our 
argument in the previous section suggests that these costs could be very significant: The law could 
stand in the way of just and unjust combatants following strategies (such as a limited trade-off rule) 
that would reduce their wrongful killing to a greater extent than they would by following the law’s 
guidance.  	
But it would be too quick to conclude that the laws of war lack justification. These potential 
costs only count against a law to the extent that its subjects are likely to in fact adopt a superior 
instrumental strategy in the law’s absence. If, however, combatants would not adopt a superior strategy 
in those circumstances, and would instead commit more serious wrongs than they would by following 
the law (as Haque predicts), then the existence of the law does not prevent valuable conformity. To 
illustrate this idea, consider again the Lazy Ambulance Driver case we briefly introduced at the end of 
Section 4: Dean the Ambulance driver can choose between driving without assistance, according to 
his own judgment; following the directives of Vicky the Radio Controller; or listening to soothing 
music on his headphones. These three options are mutually incompatible, and listed in descending 
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order of the risk they pose to pedestrians. Though Dean is aware of the benefits of listening to 
soothing music, he can’t be bothered to put on his headphones. But he is willing to obey Vicky’s 
directives. And if he does not receive her directives, Dean will drive without assistance.  	
As we argued earlier, the fact that Dean has available a superior strategy for conforming with 
his duties (using his headphones) precludes Vicky’s directives having authority for him. This is true 
even though he will not adopt this strategy. However, the relevant point right now is that Vicky’s lack 
of authority over Dean is compatible with Vicky having a straightforward justification for issuing 
directives to Dean. By guiding Dean, she brings about the best possible outcome relative to her option-
set, though not relative to his.38 
It seems plausible that the same story could be true of the laws of war. On this picture, the 
LOAC provides combatants with what we earlier called a narrow and not a wide service: it improves 
their compliance with their moral duties relative to how they will in fact act, but not relative to how 
they could act given their alternative available means of achieving compliance. Though the narrow 
service Haque identifies fails to vindicate the law’s authority, it may well still provide a service of 
sufficient value to justify the law’s existence.  
Interestingly, cases like this suggest that the relationship between justification and authority 
may be more complex than often thought. They show that sometimes the law lacks the moral power 
to impose duties that it claims, and is yet justified (at least in part) because it claims such power and 
(at least some of) its subjects treat its directives as if they imposed duties. Another way of putting this 
is that an institution may be morally justified, in virtue of possessing what is sometimes called mere de 
facto authority, and yet lack justified authority. De facto authority is usually taken to exist where a 
person or institution either claims or is acknowledged by others to have justified authority.39 Justified 
de facto authority is simply de facto authority with regard to which such claims or acknowledgements 
are justified. It is natural to assume that such claims or acknowledgments are justified if and only if 
they are correct. Since they are correct if and only if the authority is in fact justified, it would then follow 
that justified de facto authority just is justified authority. Our discussion here, however, points to a 
																																																						
38 This reflects a point made earlier: questions of law’s justification adopt the perspective of the legislator, whereas questions 
of law’s authority are framed from the perspective of the law’s subject. 
39 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 46. 
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distinct notion of justified de facto authority – where those claims are mostly false, and yet worth 
making – which we should include in a full moral evaluation of institutions:  
 	
Justified De Facto Authority: An individual or institution claims to possess the moral power to 
place others under duties by issuing commands, and (some of) those purportedly subject to 
its authority acknowledge it as having this power, and it is all-things-considered valuable that the 
individual or institution makes those claims. In virtue of its value, individuals may have moral reasons (or even 
duties) to create the institution and see to it that it makes those claims, support it in making those claims, 
refrain from undermining its ability to make those claims, etc. 	
 
 
  
	
